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Abstract
The problem of identifying shilling attacks, which are aimed at forming false ratings of objects in the recommender 
system, is considered. The purpose of such attacks is to include in the recommended list of items the goods specified by the 
attacking user. The recommendations obtained as a result of the attack will not correspond to customers' real preferences, 
which can lead to distrust of the recommender system and a drop in sales. The existing methods for detecting shilling attacks 
use explicit feedback from the user and are focused primarily on building patterns that describe the key characteristics of the 
attack. However, such patterns only partially take into account the dynamics of user interests. A method for detecting shilling 
attacks using implicit feedback is proposed by comparing the temporal description of user selection processes and ratings. 
Models of such processes are formed using a set of weighted temporal rules that define the relationship in time between the 
moments when users select a given object. The method uses time-ordered input data. The method includes the stages of form-
ing sets of weighted temporal rules for describing sales processes and creating ratings, calculating a set of ratings for these 
processes, and forming attack indicators based on a comparison of the ratings obtained. The resulting signs make it possible to 
distinguish between nuke and push attacks. The method is designed to identify discrepancies in the dynamics of purchases and 
ratings, even in the absence of rating values at certain time intervals. The technique makes it possible to identify an approach 
to masking an attack based on a comparison of the rating values and the received attack indicators. When applied iteratively, 
the method allows to refine the list of profiles of potential attackers. The technique can be used in conjunction with pattern-ori-
ented approaches to identifying shilling attacks.
Keywords: e-commerce, recommendation system, temporal rules, shilling attack, feedback.
DOI: 10.21303/2461-4262.2020.001394
1. Introduction
Recommender systems are one of the key elements of e-commerce systems. They are de-
signed to personalize the offered goods and services in accordance with the interests of a partic-
ular user [1]. For example, the streaming service Netflix receives a significant number of views 
based on personal recommendations [2]. The recommendation system “predicts” the interests of 
the target user based on information about the similarity of goods, the choice of users with similar 
interests, and ratings of objects received from clients. Recommendations building algorithms use 
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implicit and explicit feedback from the user. Implicit feedback is presented by purchases and con-
firmed by the user’s financial spending. Explicit feedback is given by ratings and reflects the user’s 
impressions of the offered goods [3].
If the consumer behaves in bad faith, the use of explicit feedback leads to the vulnerabil-
ity of the recommendation system. A malicious user can distort the ratings of objects to change 
the sales of the target group. For example, to increase the demand for a specific manufacturer’s 
goods or reduce the interest in the goods of its competitors. Therefore, when constructing recom-
mendations, it is necessary to take into account user attacks or shilling attacks [4]. Such attacks 
are based on the ability to influence the user’s interests using recommendations [5]. A shilling 
attack creates a set of fake user profiles. These profiles are used to generate artificial product 
ratings in the recommender system. As a result, clients of such systems receive a personalized 
list of objects that reflect attackers’ interests. Shilling attacks provide a short-term boost in sales 
of goods and services important to cybercriminals. However, distorted ratings undermine the 
recommendations’ credibility as a whole, which can lead to the long-term sales decline.
When conducting an attack, a malicious user solves two problems: falsifying ratings 
and masking an attack. Within the framework of the first task, the maximum possible rating 
without disclosing the attack is set for the target objects and the minimum rating for competing 
products [6]. The attack is masked by assigning ratings that are similar to those of other users. 
In works [1, 4], a classification of attacks is presented, taking into account the knowledge used 
about the recommender subsystem’s work. According to the method of masking, it is advisable 
to combine these types of attacks into three groups: concealment based on data on existing 
ratings of objects (1); masking using information about popular items (2); the cover-up of an 
attack based on product segmentation (3).
The existing methods for detecting shilling attacks are focused mainly on the formation 
of attack patterns using the results of explicit feedback [7]. Statistical methods and machine 
learning are used to build such patterns. Statistical methods are primarily focused on identifying 
attacks of the first group. Such methods reveal the key characteristics of the attacker’s profile 
that distinguish it from the average user. For example, uncharacteristic high or low ratings that 
do not match ratings from other users. To assess compliance, such indicators as the degree of 
similarity with the nearest neighbors [8], the deviation from the average rating value, taking into 
account the number of ratings and the number of users who posted these ratings [9] are used. 
Machine learning methods [10] make it possible to recognize attacks from all three groups, 
but they are very resource-intensive. Therefore, to identify complex attacks, work [11] uses a 
comparison of ratings at fixed time intervals. Work [12] proposes to dynamically change the du-
ration of time intervals at which the attack profile will be detected. In general, the first group’s 
approaches are focused on building patterns describing the differences between fake users and 
real ones, depending on the type of attack. The resulting templates only partially consider the 
changing interests of users over time. At the same time, in practice, the priorities of consumers 
change dynamically, for example, with a change in social status, workplace, or study. As a result, 
the patterns of their behavior change and, as a result, differences with fake users, which does not 
allow promptly detecting an attack on ratings.
In [13], when detecting attacks, it was proposed to take into account the temporal rules [14] 
to describe the dynamics of sales or ratings. Such rules can set both implicit constraints on the 
consumer’s choice [15] and the conditions for this choice. The approach based on the comparison 
of individual temporal rules for purchases and ratings is focused primarily on shilling attacks of 
the second group since users are constantly rating such objects. However, during attacks of the 
first group, ratings may be set irregularly. In such cases, there are no temporal rules for ratings 
at individual time intervals, which do not allow comparing the change in sales and ratings and 
detecting an attack. In [16], it is proposed to present the dynamics of forming recommendations 
for a given period in the form of a multilayer temporal graph. However, such a graph model does 
not provide a comparison of the selection and presentation of ratings.
To take into account the results of implicit feedback within the selected time period, it is ad-
visable to describe the processes of choosing a product and setting its ratings at several successive 
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intervals, linking them with temporal rules. Thus, to detect shilling attacks based on the identifica-
tion of discrepancies between object selection processes and ratings, temporal models can be used 
to take into account the dynamics of the user’s interests.
This study aimed to develop a method for the rapid detection of shilling attacks, taking into 
account the dynamics of user preferences.
To achieve the aim of research, the following objectives were set:
– develop a temporal model of the process of changing of the recommender system users’ 
preferences;
– develop a method for detecting shilling attacks based on comparing the results of explicit 
and implicit feedback from the user;
– evaluate the effectiveness of the developed method for detecting shilling attacks.
2. A temporal model of the process of changing of the recommender system users’ preferences
Changes in the users’ preferences of the recommender system with a given item are reflect-
ed in the processes of purchasing this product and setting its ratings. In order to describe the tempo-
ral order of these processes’ events, the adapted temporal rules of two types are proposed: “Next” 
and “Future”. Each of these rules sets the order in time for a pair of facts Фm and Фs, reflecting the 
choice (purchase) of a product or setting its rating. The fact becomes true when given events occur, 
such as the choice of a given object at a given time τ; selection of multiple instances of an item on 
a given subset of purchases.
Each temporal rule ( ),
j




m sr  
determines that after the fact Фm of purchase of goods ij on the interval ∆τm, the fact Фs purchase 
of goods ij on the interval ∆τs will be true. Therefore, such rules can specify temporal relationships 
between intervals or points in time and between subsets of facts ordered in time. The “Next” rule 
uses the temporal operator X, which links two successive selection/rating events [13]. When this 
rule is fulfilled, no true intermediate facts can exist between the facts Фm and Фs. The rule of type 
“Future” uses the temporal operator F, which connects two non-consecutive events. Between the 
facts Фm and Фs in the F-rule composition, there must be at least one intermediate fact. The gener-
alized form of the rule ( ),
j
m sr  is:
                                                  
( ) ( ), .jm s m sr X F= Φ ∨ Φ  (1)




m sr  sequence describes the temporal ordering of purchases (ratings) of the 
object ij for the period T:
                         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1,2 1,3 1, , 1 1,, ,..., ,..., ,..., : .
j j j j j
R S s s S S sr r r r r s+ −Π = ∀ ∆τ ∈Τ  (2)
The expression rule ( )1,2
jr  (2) contains the temporal operator X since it connects the facts Ф1 
and Ф2 of purchases (or rating assignments) on two adjacent intervals ∆τ1 and ∆τ2. Dependency ( )
1,3
jr  is an example of a rule with a temporal operator F linking facts Ф1 Ф3.
In addition to redefining the facts, the adaptation of temporal rules consists of setting their 
weights, taking into account the dynamics of the user’s interests. The weight ( ),
j




m sr  is 
set through the normalized difference between the number of purchases or the average value of the 
product’s ratings ij on the intervals ∆τm and ∆τs.
The sequence of selection of goods or setting their ratings is represented by an ordered set 
of normalized weights of the ПW rules:
                     ( )1,2 1, , 1 1, ,,..., ,..., ,..., : true .
j
W S m m S S m sw w w w m s r+ −Π = ∀ ∀ =  (3)
Based on the sequence of weights (3) for any time interval ∆τs, it is possible to evaluate ( ) ,jsW  the change in the user’s interest in the subject ij over time. This estimate combines the 



































An example of a set of rules ( ){ }, ,jm sr  that are used to calculate the score ( )4 ,jW  is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Example of a subset of rules for calculating a score ( )4
jW
This example presents a sequence of facts ordered in áФ1, Ф2, Ф3, Ф4, Ф5ñ. Such facts de-
scribe the process of choosing a given item (or setting its ratings) by various users on a continuous 
sequence of intervals 
T=á∆τ1, ∆τ2, ∆τ3, ∆τ4, ∆τ5ñ. 
In the example, the index j of the item is not specified for the sake of simplicity. The eval-
uation is formed for the current fact Ф4. This fact is connected with the previous facts by F-rules 
Ф1FФ4 and Ф2FФ4, as well as the X-rule Ф3XФ4. The weights of these rules 
( )
1,4 ,
jw  ( )2,4
jw  and ( )3,4
jw  
are used to calculate the evaluation ( )4 .
jW  If there are no ratings values in the current interval, 
the previous range rules are used to construct the score ( ) .jsW  For example, if on the interval ∆τ5 
for the one shown in Fig. 1 of the example, there are no new rating values, then its average value 
remains the same as in the interval ∆τ4. Then the weights of the Ф1FФ5, Ф2FФ5 and Ф3FФ5will 
be equal 1,4 ,
jw  2,4
jw  and 3,4
jw  respectively. The weight of the rule Ф4FФ5 is equal to zero since the 
average rating on the ∆τ5 interval has not changed compared to the ∆τ4 range due to the absence 
of new ratings.
Thus, estimate (4) on each current interval ∆τs shows how users’ preferences have changed 
to the product ij compared with all previous time intervals.
Then the model M( j) of the process of changing the user’s preferences for the subject ij is a 
sequence of evaluations ( )jsW  ordered by intervals ∆τs
                                             
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 3, ,..., .=
j j j j
sM W W W  (5)
This model describes the change in sales or ratings for each interval ∆τs, which makes 
it possible to reveal the falsification of ratings by step-by-step comparison of the corresponding 
evaluations ( ) .jsW
3. Method for detecting shilling attacks based on comparing the results of explicit and implic-
it feedback from the user
The presented method, when detecting shilling attacks, compares the models of the process-
es of changing user preferences (5), obtained as a result of implicit (sales) and explicit (ratings) feed-
back. The method forms a quantitative assessment of the discrepancies between these processes. 
The initial data of the method are: sales list L; list of Q ratings; analysis period T; object of possible 
attack ij; a subset of users – potential attackers U={uk}; the level of time detail (hour, day, week, 
month), represented by the length of the interval ∆τs. The original sales and rating lists include 
the following elements: uk user id; the moment of choosing/setting the rating τs; the number nk of 

















The method includes the following stages.
Stage 1. Preliminary processing of initial data. At this stage, data sets are formed for 
constructing sales facts, as well as the facts of assigning ratings at intervals ∆τs. The result of 
this stage is sets of facts of purchases { },Φ j items  and ratings { }, .j ratingsΦ  These facts contain infor-
mation about the quantity of the purchased item ( )jsn  and the average rating of this item 
( )ρ js  at 
intervals ∆τs for uk users.
Stage 2. Construction in accordance with (2) sets of temporal rules for user selection ,Π j itemR  
and rating assignment , .j ratingRΠ  At this stage, Next-rules and Future-rules in the form (1) are formed 
from pairs of facts ( ), ,, ,Φ Φj item j itemsm s  and ( ), ,, .j rating j ratingm sΦ Φ
Stage 3. Formation, following expression (3), sets of weights of temporal rules for purchases 
,Π j itemW  and 
,Π j ratingW  ratings, respectively.
Step 3. 1. Construction of the set ,Π j itemW  is performed by normalizing the difference in the 
number of purchases ns–nm for all rules from the set 
, .Π j itemR
Step 3. 2. Construction of the set ,Π j ratingW  is performed by normalizing the difference in 
ratings for the elements of the set , .Π j ratingR
Stage 4. Building models of the processes of changing user preferences ,j invoiceM  for sales 
and ,j ratingM  for setting ratings.
Stage 5. Identification of intervals of a possible shilling attack. At this stage, both quantita-
tive and qualitative differences between the corresponding elements of the sequences ,j invoiceM  and 
,j ratingM  are taken into account.
Step 5. 1. Formation of a set of quantitative discrepancies D( j) between the purchasing and 
rating processes:
( ) ( ){ },j jsD d=
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,if 0 0 0 0 .
0 otherwise.
j item j rating j item j rating j item j rating
j s s s s s s
s
W W W W W W
d
 + ≥ ∧ < ∨ £ ∧ >= 

       (6)
At this step, the evaluations ,j itemsW  and 
,j rating
sW  are summed up modulo in the case of op-
positely directed changes in demand and rating, since such a multidirectionalness may indicate a 
possible attack.
Step 5. 2. Formation of the set of features A( j) of a possible attack of fake users based on the 
discrepancies D( j):
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The condition of equality of the ratings , ,1 ,
j rating j rating
s sW W −=  represented by the “otherwise” 
clause in (7), blocks the formation of the attack attribute when the rating remains unchanged on a 
pair of successive intervals ∆τs-1 and ∆τs. This condition is fulfilled in the absence of information 
about the ratings on the interval ∆τs. Negative values 
( )j
sa  indicate a possible attack to downgrade 
competitor products, while positive values indicate an attack aimed at increasing the rating of the 
target item.








Step 1. The input of initial data.
At this step, it is necessary to enter data on sales L, rating Q, period T, subject ij; users U, 
and the granularity levels of the time. The granularity of time depends on the format of timestamps 
in sales and rating logs.
Step 2. Dividing the period T into time intervals ∆τs.
At this step, a time granularity level is selected that provides the highest value of the weights 
of the sales process rules 
, ,= ∑j item j items
s
W W  
for all intervals from period T. The result of this step is a set of intervals ∆τs for period T.
Step 3. Implementation of the developed method for detecting shilling attacks.
Step 4. Clarification of the list of users. From the set U at n iterations, users ( ) ,nku  are re-
moved who did not set ratings at intervals ∆τs with a sign 
( ) 0,≠jsa  since these users did not take part 
in distorting ratings. The result of the step is a subset of users U(n), containing potential attackers.
Step 5. Checking the algorithm’s termination condition ( ) ( 1)n nU U −=  according to which 
the number of users at the current n iteration has not changed compared to iteration n–1. When this 
condition is met, the operation of the algorithm ends. Otherwise, step 6 is performed.
Step 6. Refinement of the set of Q ratings. User ratings are removed from this set since these 
users ( ) ,nku  are not attackers. Next, the transition to the execution of the method at step 3 of the 
algorithm is performed.
Fig. 2. Algorithm for the implementation of the proposed method
The algorithm execution results can be used for additional analysis of the method of con-
cealing a shilling attack. This analysis is performed based on the comparison of deviations ( )jsd  and 
characteristics ( ) .jsa
4. Results of experimental evaluation of the method for detecting shilling attacks
The experiment’s goal was to test the effectiveness of the method for detecting shilling attacks on 
a time-ordered dataset of ratings and sales without information about absolute values of points in time. 
The basic assumption was that using a relative time scale and taking into account the use of F-rules, it is 
possible to distinguish intervals by the number of purchases of goods or services. In [17], it was shown 
that it is possible to form a description of the process by ordering events on the “earlier-later” time scale, 
taking into account their attributes, which makes it possible to justify this assumption.
The experiment included two phases. In the first phase, attacks were detected on the initial 
data set and an analysis of ways to conceal an attack. In the second phase, the proposed method’s 
effectiveness is compared with the methods [11, 12], which, similarly to the proposed method, im-
plement the partitioning of the initial data set into time intervals.
During the experiment, a dataset was used with information about the reading and ratings 
of several million books [18]. Read, and rating entries are ordered by time, but there are no absolute 
1. The іnput of
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2. Dividing the time period T into
intervals ∆τs.  
3. Implementation of the method
for detecting shilling attacks
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timestamps in the original data. The facts ( )Φ jm  and 
( )Φ js  were formed on subsets of the input data 
from a fixed number of records.
The first phase looked at detecting attacks over long periods, represented by a large number 
of purchases. When constructing facts, subsets of 100,000 consecutive items (reading, ratings) were 
used. Such subsets correspond to the original intervals of the method and are denoted by ∆s. The 





The result of 
a step
Components of the result by subsets Δs
∆2 ∆3 ∆4 ∆5 ∆6 ∆7 ∆8 ∆9 ∆10
4. 1 M10000, item 0.19 0.19 –0.41 0.04 –0.63 –0.52 0.07 –1.00 –0.59
4. 2 M10000, rating –0.10 –0.10 –0.30 –0.30 –0.30 –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 1.00
5. 1 D(10000) 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.59
5. 2 A(10000) –1 –1 0 0 0 0 –1 0 1
The results of steps 4. 1 and 4. 2 in the Table 1 contains a description of the process of select-
ing an i10000 object by users, as well as the process of forming ratings for this object. For example, ac-
cording to the results of step 4.1, for the second subset ∆2, only one temporal rule 
( )10000
1,2 1 2 ,= Φ Φr X  
connecting it with the previous subset is valid. The score value 1,10000 0000,2
item itemW M∈  of 0.19 is the 
normalized weight of this rule and shows the increase in sales by ∆2 compared to ∆1. The indica-
tor 10000,4 0.41
itemW = −  reflects the general drop in sales by ∆4 compared to ∆1, ∆2, and ∆3. The sign ( ) ( )10000
2
10000∈a A  has a negative value and therefore indicates a possible attack aimed at reducing 
sales. This sign 
( )10000
10 ,a  in turn, indicates a possible attack aimed at increasing the rating. The indi-
cators of the rating dynamics for ∆5 and ∆6 were formed using the rules for ∆4, since the rating for 
the i10000 object was not presented in the indicated subsets.
The experiment results with the selected object make it possible to analyze approaches to 
masking an attack. Revealing a method of concealing a possible attack is carried out based on a 
comparison of the signs of a shilling attack: ( )10000sd  and 
( )10000 ,sa  as shown in Fig. 3. On ∆2 and ∆3, 
there is a mismatch between the increase in sales and the simultaneous decrease in the rating com-
pared to ∆1. Since the magnitude of the discrepancy has not changed: 
( ) ( )10000 10000
2 3 0.28d d= =  then 
the probable attack occurred in interval ∆2. A disparity of less than 50 % of the maximum possible 
value indicates the possibility of concealing an attack, taking into account the average rating of 
existing items. The value ( )100002 1= −a  indicates a possible shilling attack to downgrade the rating.
There is also a deviation ( )100005d  on the interval ∆5. This deviation is not a sign of an at-
tack ( )( )100005 0 ,=a  since the estimates 10000,4 itemW  and 10000,5 itemW  coincide. The coincidence of ratings 
means that users did not put ratings in the subsequent interval ∆5.
The discrepancy ( )100008d  describes the dynamics of the user’s choice in the intervals from ∆2 
to ∆8 inclusive. This deviation indicates a possible shilling attack at one of these intervals.
























Sales Ratings Divergence Possible attack
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However, since ( )100008d  it covers all previous deviations and has a value less than 
( )10000
2 ,d  the 
probable attack occurred on interval ∆2.
The discrepancy ( )1000010 1.59d =  indicates a possible attack on the intervals from ∆2 to ∆10. 
Since this value is significantly higher than ( )100002d  and 
( )10000
8 ,d  the probable attack occurred on 
the interval ∆10. The value 
( )10000
10 1=a  indicates a possible shilling attack to increase the rating. A 
discrepancy ( )1000010d  greater than 50 % of the maximum indicates possible concealment of an attack 
using popular items. A check was carried out on popular properties (with a large number of pur-
chases) to confirm this. For example, the popular i10 has been selected over 91,000 times. The rating 
of this object increases on sets ∆9 and ∆10, which confirms the hypothesis about masking the attack 
using the rating of popular items.
Thus, this method allows to identify ways to mask an attack in conditions of incomplete 
rating data using data ordered on an “earlier-later” timeline.
The second phase of the experiment is devoted to comparing the proposed method’s effective-
ness with those of [11, 12]. These methods perform splitting into intervals under the condition of a 
sharp change in rating values over a limited period. The accuracy evaluation was used for comparing 
the methods. The accuracy evaluation is defined as the number of detected attacks to the number of 
all attacks. Attacks have been generated to downgrade (nuke attacks) and increase (push attacks) 
ratings of three targeted items. In the first case, the rating was set equal to zero, and in the second – 
equal to 5. These attacks were included in the set of Q ratings. Previously, in accordance with the algo-
rithm in Fig. 2, the division into intervals was performed using evaluation of changes in user prefer-
ences for three books. The interval with the maximum weight value (4), taking into account rounding, 
was 9000 purchases. The results of the second phase of the experiment are shown in Fig. 4, 5.
Fig. 4. Comparison of the detection accuracy of nuke attacks for different methods
The method [12] for detecting anomalies based on dynamic division for time series is rep-
resented by the abbreviation DP. The method [11] for detecting anomalous elements based on time 
intervals is represented by abbreviating TI. The developed method is represented by the abbrevia-
tion EF (Explicit Feedback).
At the initial stage of rating falsification, when forming up to 10 attacks to increase the 
rating (push attacks), the developed EF method allows increasing the accuracy from 8 % to 23 % 
compared to the DP method, and by more than 30 % compared to the TI method. In nuke (down-
grade) attacks, the increase in accuracy at the initial stage ranged from 5 to 23 % compared to 
the DP method and over 30 % for the TI method. However, in the future, as the number of attacks 
increases, DP, TI methods show similar or higher accuracy compared to EF. Such characteristics 
determine that the scope of the developed method is the initial stage of actions of an attacking user.









































5. Discussion of the results of developing a method for detecting shilling attacks
The result of the work is a method for identifying shilling attacks of users based on a 
quantitative assessment of inconsistencies in the temporal characteristics of the purchasing pro-
cesses and rating, reflecting the results of objective and subjective feedback from the user. The 
method uses temporal rules (1), which describe the change in sales or ratings of the same object 
for arbitrary pairs of time intervals. A set (2) of such rules describes the general temporal char-
acteristics of the processes of selecting a target product and setting its ratings.
The method builds models (5) of the processes of changing user preferences, using weighted 
temporal rules. The difference from interval methods [11, 12] is that the signs of shilling attacks 
are revealed by comparing the elements (4) of the models of processes of purchasing and forming 
ratings. The result of the method is a list of possible attack intervals for a given list of users.
The difference between the proposed method and [13] in detecting a shilling attack consists 
in the use of a set of temporal rules that associate all previous intervals with the current one (Fig. 1), 
which makes it possible to obtain a generalized estimate of the discrepancies between sales and rating.
The advantage of the method is the ability to identify discrepancies between the dynamics 
of purchases and ratings at the initial stages of the attack (Fig. 4). Also, in the case of the incom-
pleteness of the latter (Table 1). When implemented iteratively, the method allows a detailed list 
of potential attackers. Comparative analysis of the attack indicators obtained as a result of the 
method execution allows to classify the used approaches to attack masking (Fig. 2).
The method allows increasing the accuracy by at least 8 % for attacks to increase the 
rating (Fig. 5) and 5 % in attacks to downgrade (Fig. 4) at the very beginning of the actions of 
attacking users, with a small number of attacks. Therefore, it is advisable to use the method on-
line in order to identify changes in the behavior of attacking users quickly.
The disadvantage of this method is that the detection of an attack does not take into account 
the possible partial time shift between purchases and ratings. The bias is due to the fact that some 
users give a rating after a purchase with a delay. The effect of this bias depends on the granularity 
of time. The longer the length of the time intervals, the less the impact of the rating lag.
The method imposes a time ordering constraint on the input. The additional requirement for 
timestamps in the input allows to identify the intervals of the attack more accurately.
The developed method is intended for iterative refinement of both the time intervals for car-
rying out shilling attacks and the list of possible attackers under conditions of periodic changes in 
real users’ interests, including online. The method forms a process description of user actions and, 
therefore, can be applied to identify abnormal situations in process-oriented systems after adaptation.
Further development of the method is associated with the use of rules with the temporal 
operator “Until,” which will allow formalizing the change of interests of user groups as a result 
of external events, for example, large presentations of new goods and services. Combining the 
considered temporal rules will make it possible to take into account both periodic and seasonal 
changes in user requirements when detecting shilling attacks.
6. Conclusions
1. A temporal model of changing the preferences of the users of the recommender system 
has been developed. The model is characterized by using a time-ordered sequence of numerical 
evaluations of changes in user preferences for the target item. Each evaluation specifies the change 
for the current interval concerning the previous time intervals. The model allows to estimate the 
increase or decrease in the user’s interest in the target subject in the current range compared to all 
previous time intervals. A comparison of models obtained based on explicit and implicit feedback 
makes it possible to identify attacks aimed at artificially changing items’ ratings.
2. A method for detecting shilling attacks based on a comparison of the processes of 
changing user preferences in sales and rating assignments for a given period is proposed. This 
method differs from the existing ones by using a temporally ordered set of generalized evalua-
tions of the discrepancies between these processes to detect shilling attacks.
The proposed method allows for detecting shilling attacks at the initial stage of rating fal-
sification in the absence of ratings at certain intervals within a given period. The method allows 
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identifying approaches to masking an attack taking into account the current combination of rating 
values and attack indicators, as well as iteratively refining the list of fake user profiles.
3. Experimental evaluation of the method was carried out on data sets obtained as a result 
of implicit and explicit communication from users. The experimental results showed an increase 
in the detection accuracy at the initial stages of a push attack by at least 5 %, and a nuke attack 
by at least 8 %, which makes it possible to apply the method in the online mode of the recom-
mender system.
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